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Abstract 
In many countries with legal systems based on English common law, pharmacy 
regulators have a responsibility to protect, promote and maintain the health and 
safety of patients. Where there is a potential risk to patient safety, or where the 
public’s confidence in pharmacy could be adversely affected by the actions of a 
pharmacist, these regulators have a statutory duty to investigate concerns. The legal 
provisions underpinning each jurisdiction’s disciplinary processes depict distinctive 
outlooks from the different authorities, as each works towards the same goal. 
Legal statues, regulations, rules, and guidance affecting the disciplinary process in 
Great Britain, Australia, New York and New Brunswick were collated, and the 
processes they describe were attached to a common process flow diagram for step-
by-step evaluation of their respective legal provisions. 
The initial stages of the respective investigation process are broadly similar in all the 
jurisdictions examined: however, each process has subtle differences that afford 
some level of advantage or disadvantage over its comparators. Factors including: 
how matters of discipline are framed; the existence of a separate process for minor 
and uncontested violations; the ability to effect an interim suspension of a 
practitioner’s license; threshold criteria for escalation of complaints; the membership 
of disciplinary panels; and the perceived independence of these panels all 
philosophically affect the public safety remit of each regulator. 
This work constitutes the first comparison of international regulatory frameworks for 
the profession of pharmacy. Of the four jurisdictions examined, Great Britain most 
clearly acts in the interest of the public and the profession – rather than the 
respondent pharmacist – at every step of its process. 
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Professional regulation in pharmacy 
Healthcare regulators have a remit to protect, promote and maintain the health and 
safety of people who use professional services. Where there is a potential risk to 
patient safety, or where the public’s confidence in pharmacy could be adversely 
affected by the actions of a pharmacist, regulators have a statutory duty to 
investigate such concerns. Here, we compare and contrast the processes in place in 
four English-speaking countries with legal systems based on English common law, 
namely: Great Britain, Australia, the USA, and Canada. In both North American 
countries, the regulation of healthcare professionals is dealt with on a state – rather 
than a federal – basis, so the states of New York and New Brunswick have been 
chosen as being representative of the processes in the USA and Canada, 
respectively. 
In each of the four jurisdictions, processes are in place which allow complaints 
against registrants to be investigated and – where appropriate – for adjudicatory 
tribunal proceedings to be instigated. As the gatekeepers to licensure or registration 
as a pharmacist in their respective jurisdictions, regulators may restrict the practice 
of registrants or apply other sanctions where it is necessary in the best interest of 
patients, the public, or the profession. As one might expect, the disciplinary 
processes of each regulator are macroscopically very similar: however, upon closer 
inspection, small differences that philosophically change the nature of these 
proceedings and what they seek to achieve (Fig. 1). 
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Fig. 1: The disciplinary processes activated by the receipt from a member of the 
public of a complaint against a pharmacist in: (a) Great Britain; (b) Australia; (c) New 
York; and (d) New Brunswick. 
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The General Pharmaceutical Council (GPhC) is the independent regulator for 
pharmacists in Great Britain. It has a responsibility to promote and maintain the 
health, safety and wellbeing of patients and the public. This includes a remit to set 
standards that pharmacy professionals must meet. Where there are concerns that a 
pharmacist has failed to maintain the required standards, the GPhC has twofold duty 
both to carry out an investigation of complaints, and to adjudicate in hearings arising 
from such investigations. 
Similarly, the New Brunswick College of Pharmacy (NBCP) fulfils the roles of 
standard-setter, investigator and adjudicator in the eastern Canadian maritime 
province of New Brunswick. 
Complaints made against Australian pharmacists are investigated by the Pharmacy 
Board of Australia (PBA) with administrative support from the Australian Health 
Practitioner Regulatory Authority (AHPRA), while adjudication is a separate function 
carried out by each state or territory’s judicial system.  
In each of Great Britain, New Brunswick, and Australia, there is a separate regulator 
for the profession of pharmacy: however, New York State has a single regulator for 
all professions requiring licensure. The University of the State of New York 
(USNY) is a governmental umbrella organization responsible for the general 
supervision of all educational activities within the state. It is a licensing 
and accreditation body that sets standards for education from pre-
kindergarten through professional and graduate school, as well as for the practice of 
a wide variety of professions. The group of people who make decisions about and for 
USNY is known as the New York State Board of Regents. The Regents are 
responsible for the general supervision of all educational activities within the State, 
presiding over the University and the New York State Education Department. 
Unlike medical discipline, which is regulated under New York State Public Health 
law,[1] the disciplinary process for pharmacy is regulated by the state’s Education 
law.[2] To ensure protection of the public, the New York State Education 
Department's Office of the Professions (NYOP) investigates and prosecutes 
professional misconduct in more than 50 professions, excluding only medicine.  
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Methodology 
The authors are based in Great Britain and Australia, respectively, and these 
jurisdictions were initially chosen for comparison. There is a single regulator for 
pharmacy in Great Britain, and since 2010 the regulation of pharmacists in Australia 
has been harmonised in all states and territories following the enactment of the 
National Law.[3] Canada and the USA were added to the study as, like Australia, the 
law their constituent states and territories are based on English common law (with 
the exception of Quebec and Louisiana, which are modelled on French and Spanish 
civil law, respectively). Each of the 50 US states, 13 Canadian provinces and three 
territories regulate the profession of pharmacy at a state level. As such, no state can 
be said to be representative of any federal pharmacy law in the country in which it 
sits. New York and New Brunswick were chosen as states in which the entirety of the 
legal statue affecting the regulation of the pharmacy profession is available on-line in 
a consolidated form, and at no cost. 
Legal statues, regulations, rules, and guidance affecting the disciplinary process 
within each jurisdiction were collated to create on overview of their respective 
procedures. These were subsequently compared with a view to matching analogous 
events from the respective regulators’ processes. Once each event was fitted to a 
sequential diagram (Fig.1), a more nuanced comparison of each step in the 
disciplinary process was carried out by evaluating specific legal provisions applied in 
each jurisdiction. 
Investigation 
Initial assessment of complaints 
Great Britain 
In Great Britain, the General Pharmaceutical Council is responsible for investigating 
concerns about those who wish to be registered as pharmacists.[4](art.4(3)(a) Such 
concerns typically take the form of a complaint from a member of the public. 
Allegations made are usually subject to a review by the Registrar to determine if it is 
appropriate to proceed with an investigation.[4](art.52(1)) 
Australia 
Similarly, upon receipt of a notification (complaint) against an Australian practitioner, 
the AHPRA must conduct a preliminary assessment.[5](s.149(1)) The AHPRA may 
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further investigate a pharmacist if the PBA decides it is necessary or 
appropriate.[5](s.160) 
New York 
The NYOP initially investigate each complaint which alleges conduct constituting 
professional misconduct.[2](s.6510(1)(b)) The results of the investigation are then referred 
to the professional conduct officer (PCO). If the PCO decides that there is not 
substantial evidence of professional misconduct, or that further proceedings are not 
warranted, no further action is taken. However, if the PCO, after consultation with a 
member of the New York State Board of Pharmacy, determines that there is 
substantial evidence of professional misconduct, a further investigation must be 
conducted. 
New Brunswick 
The complaints process at the New Brunswick College of Pharmacy (NBCP) is 
overseen by the Administrator of Complaints.[6](s.74) Complaints must be made in 
writing,[6](s.76(1)) Such complaints are usually received from a member of the public: 
however, the Registrar of the College may act where no complaint has been 
received from any other person, and it is in the public interest that action be taken 
immediately.[6](s.77) Upon receipt of a complaint, the Administrator must, if necessary, 
obtain additional information from the complainant, and carry out an initial 
investigation.[6](s.78) At this point, the complaint may be dismissed if, in the opinion of 
the Administrator, it is without merit.[6](s.78(2)(e)) 
Investigation of complaints 
Great Britain 
A GPhC investigation, carried out under rule 6(3) of the Fitness to Practise Rules 
2010,[7] involves obtaining further information from the complainant or from the 
organisation that has referred the matter. Investigations are carried out by the 
GPhC’s in-house inspectorate, established under art. 8 of the Pharmacy Order 
2010.[4] Inspectors may enter register pharmacy premises and examine or confiscate 
evidence, as part of their powers under the Order.[4](art. 11(1)(e) The GPhC have limited 
powers to reprimand a registrant where an investigation exposes minor deviations 
from expected standards, or if the investigation has failed to reveal any of the 
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behaviours described in art. 51 of the Pharmacy Order 2010 as causing the 
pharmacist’s fitness to practise to be impaired.[4]  
Australia 
The investigators in Australian cases may be contracted by the AHPRA, but are 
usually members of their staff.[5](s.163) As soon as practicable after completing an 
investigation, the investigator must give a written report to the PBA, which must 
include: the findings of the investigation; and the investigator’s recommendations 
about any action to be taken.[5](s.166) At this point, the PBA can reprimand a registrant 
in cases involving minor deviations from expected standards.[5](s.178) If, it reasonably 
believes that the pharmacist’s professional conduct or performance may be merely 
unsatisfactory, it may establish a Performance and Professional Standards 
Panel.[5](s.182(1)) Cases involving seriously deficient conduct or performance must be 
referred to tribunal for adjudication. 
New York 
All complaints referred back to the NYOP by the PCO must be investigated. If 
complaint to be investigated by the NYOP involves a question of professional 
expertise (i.e. would not apply to every profession regulated by the Department of 
Education), then the PCO may seek, and – if so – must obtain, the concurrence of at 
least two members of a panel of three members of the New York State Board of 
Pharmacy.[2](s.6510(1)(b)) If the PCO determines that there is substantial evidence of 
professional misconduct, but that it is an initial violation of a minor or technical nature 
which would not justify the imposition of a more severe disciplinary penalty, the 
matter may be terminated by the issuance of an administrative warning.[2](s.6510(2)(b)) 
Such warnings are confidential, do not constitute an adjudication of guilt, and cannot 
be used as evidence that the licensee is guilty of the alleged misconduct. 
New Brunswick 
The NBCP must investigate all matters that may constitute conduct deserving 
sanction.[6](s.80) The Council or the Registrar of the NBCP can assign inspectors.[8](reg. 
8.5(1)) Inspectors may enter and inspect pharmacies and examine anything found 
there.[6](s.119) 
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“Investigating Committees” 
Great Britain 
At the end of the investigation, the Registrar of the GPhC may choose to refer the 
matter for considered by the Investigation Committee.[7](rule 6) The Investigating 
Committee consists of a lay chairman, two lay deputy chairmen, and between three 
and eleven other members (either lay or registrant).[9](rule 3(1)) A quorate investigation 
committee must have at least a chairperson, one pharmacist, and one lay 
panellist.[9](rule 18(2)) At any meeting or hearing of any committee, the number of 
registrant members considering a case must not exceed the number of lay members 
by more than one.[9](rule 18(3)) The Investigating Committee sits in private,[7](rule 9(1)) and 
may not consider oral evidence.[7](rule 9(2)) The committee have powers to dismiss the 
case, to issue a warning, to agree undertakings with the registrant, to give advice, or 
to refer the matter to the Fitness to Practise Committee.[7](rule 7(1)) 
Australia 
The PBA’s Performance and Professional Standards Panel is analgous to the 
GPhC’s Investigating Committee. A panel must consist of at least three 
members.[5](s.182(2)) At least half, but no more than two-thirds, of the panel must 
pharmacists chosen from a list approved by the PBA under s.183 of the National 
Law.[5](s.182(4)) Hearings before a panel are not open to the public.[5](s.189) Professional 
Standards Panels are free to decide their own procedures, [5](s.185(1)) but are required 
to observe the principles of natural justice.[5](s.185(2)) Where a practitioner has behaved 
in a way that constitutes unsatisfactory professional performance or unprofessional 
conduct, panels may direct that no further action be taken; impose conditions on the 
doctors practise; issue a caution; or reprimand the doctor.[5](s.191(3)) Where threshold 
criteria are reached, it must refer the case for tribunal.[5](s.193) 
New York 
In New York, violations involving professional misconduct of a minor or technical 
nature may be resolved by the Violations Committee, who may issue an 
administrative warning, a censure or reprimand, or a fine not exceeding 
$500.[2](s.6510(2)(a-c)) This expedited process is only available where the minor 
violations are uncontested. Contested disciplinary proceedings must be tried before 
a hearing panel of the New York State Board of Pharmacy. [2](s.6510(2)(a-c)) The 
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committee must consist of at least three members of the state board, at least one of 
whom shall be a lay member to be appointed by the executive secretary of the state 
board.[2](s.6510(2)(c)) In cases solely involving professional misconduct that applies to all 
regulated professions (e.g. fraudulently obtaining a license, or committing a crime), 
listed in s.6509 of Title 8, the PCO may refer the matter directly to a Regents Review 
Committee.(s.6510(2)(d))  
New Brunswick 
The Complaints Committee of the CPNB consists of six members and at least two 
lay representatives.[6](s.82(1-2)) A sitting panel consists of at least of three members; at 
least one of whom must be a lay.[6](s.83(1)) Panels meet in private.[6](s.104(2)) Any 
questions arising are decided by vote: the chair has a deciding vote.[8](s.9.9(1))  The 
Complaints Committee may conduct interviews with the complainant or the 
pharmacist, but do not hold adversarial hearings.[6](s.84)  The committee may dismiss 
the complaint; counsel, caution or reprimand the respondent; issue a fine; or refer 
the whole or part of the complaint to the Discipline and Fitness to Practise 
Committee.[6](s.87) 
Interim measures 
Great Britain 
If, at any point during an investigation, the Fitness to Practise Committee of the 
GPhC is satisfied that it is necessary for the protection of members of the public, or 
is otherwise in the public interest, or is in the interests of a registrant for an entry in 
the Register relating to a registrant to be suspended or to be made subject to 
conditions, they may do so by issuing an interim order.[4](art. 56)(1)) The committee has 
the authority to impose an order for up to 18 months, subject to a review every 6 
months that the order is in force. Upon review, the panel may decide to revoke the 
order, vary the existing conditions, or replace an existing conditions order with a 
suspension order (or vice versa), which will take effect for the remaining period of up 
to 18 months.[4](art. 56(3)) Alternatively, the High Court may decide to revoke an interim 
order, which has lasted its maximum period, if they consider the imposition or further 
extension of an order will not be beneficial in the interests of both the public and 
pharmacist.[4](art. 56(8)) Where the court makes such a decision, it is final.[4](art. 56(9))    
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Australia 
The Pharmacy Board of Australia has the power to make an immediate order in 
relation to a pharmacist’s registration at any time, if it believes this is necessary to 
protect the public.[5](s.156) This is an interim step that can be taken while more 
information is gathered or while other processes are put in place. The action has 
immediate effect, and continues to have effect until either: the decision is set aside 
on appeal; or the suspension is revoked, or the conditions are removed, by the 
Board.[5](s.159) 
New York 
The NYOP cannot suspend the registration of a pharmacist as an interim measure. 
New Brunswick 
In New Brunswick, the Complaints Committee may, if it considers it probable that the 
continued practice of the respondent will be harmful to the public, pending final 
disposition of the matter, make an order suspending the respondent or placing 
conditions on their practice.[6](s.88(1)) Although there is no time limit to such an order, it 
may only be issued once the Complaints Committee has referred a matter to the 
Discipline and Fitness to Practise Committee for adjudication (i.e after, not during, 
and investigation). A pharmacist against whom an order is made may apply to the 
Court of Queen's Bench of New Brunswick for an order staying the action of the 
Committee.[6](s.89(1)) 
Health concerns 
All four territories have additional processes in place where the pharmacist’s 
misconduct is as a result of poor mental or physical health: however, these are 
extensive and varied, and are more suited to full discussion in a separate 
publication. 
Adjudication 
Membership 
Great Britain 
Quorum for a meeting of the GPhC’s Fitness to Practise Committee is three 
members, to include a legally-qualified chair or deputy chair, a lay member and a 
registrant member.[9](rule 18(1)) For the majority of hearings, this has the effect of 
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ensuring that two members of the panel of three are not registered pharmacists. In 
exceptional circumstances, where the chair requires specified members to sit on a 
panel, the number of registrant members may not exceed the number of lay 
members by more than one.[9](rule 18(3)). Lay members may not be – or ever have been 
– entered in the register of any regulatory body overseen by the Professional 
Standards Authority for Health and Social Care (PSA).[9](rule 2) This measure 
precludes doctors, dentists and other allied health professions from sitting on the 
Committee. 
Australia 
The membership of an Australian tribunal panel is dependent on the state or territory 
in which the misconduct is alleged to have occurred: for example, in South Australia, 
a typical panel will be made up of a president or deputy president (who is a 
magistrate), two pharmacist members and one lay member;[10](s.15) while in New 
South Wales, a senior member, who is legally qualified, is assisted by two 
pharmacists and one lay member.[11](s.27) In no case is there ever a majority of lay 
members on a panel. 
New York 
Hearings in New York are conducted by a panel of three or more members, at least 
two of whom must be members of the State Board for Pharmacy, and at least one of 
whom must be a member of the applicable state board or of the state board for 
another profession licensed by the Department of Education.[2](s.6510(3)(b)) One of the 
members in the former class is designated the chairman. In addition to the panel 
members, the department designates an administrative officer, admitted to practice 
as an attorney in the state of New York, who has the authority to rule on all motions, 
procedures and other legal objections. The administrative officer is not entitled to a 
vote as part of the panel’s deliberations. After the commencement of a hearing, no 
panel member may be replaced: a determination by the administrative officer of a 
need to disqualify or remove any panel member results in the disqualification or 
removal of the panel and cause a new panel to be appointed. 
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New Brunswick 
New Brunswick’s Discipline and Fitness to Practise Committee sit in panels of at 
least five, which must include only one lay representative, and decisions of a panel 
are taken by majority vote.[6](s.91(4)) 
How matters of discipline are framed 
Great Britain 
The terms used to define a departure from expected standards differ greatly between 
jurisdictions. In the UK, all healthcare regulators assess a registrants “fitness to 
practise”, which requires them to have the skills, knowledge, good health and good 
character to do their job safely and effectively. The medical profession was the first 
to apply this concept, following the amendment of s.35 of the Medical Act in 
2002.[12] Since that time, all charges levelled by the General Medical Council (GMC) 
at tribunal must be assessed at in terms of whether the doctor’s fitness to practise is 
“impaired”.[13] The introduction of the concept of impairment was designed to 
remove the cumbersome procedural complications that had arisen from maintaining 
four conceptually distinct channels of discipline, namely: 
• serious professional misconduct; 
• deficient performance; 
• seriously deficient performance; and 
• health concerns.[14] 
Although the concept of “impairment” is not defined in the statutory provisions, it 
involves some deterioration of the registrant’s ability to practise their profession. The 
pharmacy profession adopted this model in 2007, when the Pharmacists and 
Pharmacy Technicians Order came into force,[15] and continued it following the 
enactment of the Pharmacy Order in 2010.[4]  
Australia 
Under Australia’s new National Law, the AHPRA continues to recognise four broadly 
equivalent disciplinary channels, namely: 
• professional misconduct; 
• unprofessional conduct; 
• unsatisfactory performance; and 
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• health concerns.[10](s.196(1)(b)(i-iv)) 
New Brunswick 
Although called the Discipline and Fitness to Practise Committee, the NBCP’s 
adjudicating panel does not apply the concept of fitness to practise as recognised by 
the GPhC. Rather, it maintains five channels of discipline: 
• professional misconduct; 
• conduct unbecoming a member of the College of Pharmacists; 
• incompetence; 
• acting in breach of the Pharmacy Act, its regulations, the Code of Ethics, or 
practice directives; and 
• any other matter that does not meet the prevailing standards of practice or 
conduct, 
although the fourth and fifth do little more than qualify the first and second,[6](s.69(1)) 
leaving them well-matched with the routes adopted by Australia and those recently 
abandoned by the UK. 
New York 
In contrast to the others, New York maintains a single distinct channel of discipline, 
namely; professional misconduct. The New York state statute book contains a 
comprehensive list of definitions of professional misconduct applicable to 
professionals,[2](s.6509) supplemented by input from members of the State Board of 
Pharmacy at the investigation stage, and again at hearing. 
Proceedings 
Great Britain 
Although the proceedings in all four jurisdictions described here follow the adversary 
process, the concept of impairment if fitness to practise constrains the format of 
GPhC hearings, which must follow a rigid structure comprising three stages, namely: 
1. Finding on the facts, during which the panel decides on disputed facts before 
moving on to stage 2; 
2. Deciding whether or not fitness to practise is impaired, during which the panel 
considers whether the registrant’s fitness to practise is impaired based on the 
facts found; and 
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3. Imposing a sanction, at which stage the panel may issue an appropriate 
sanction. 
At stage 2, the panel are required to decide on whether or not a pharmacist’s fitness 
to practise is [currently] impaired; not whether it was impaired at the time at which 
the proven facts occurred. If the panel concludes that the pharmacist’s fitness to 
practise is impaired, the hearing moves to stage 3, where a sanction may be applied 
in accordance with the GPhC’s guidance.[7](rule 31(12)) Following a successful High 
Court appeal of a decision by the General Medical Council (GMC), relevant factors 
must be considered not only when determining sanction, but also when initially 
assessing a practitioner’s fitness to practice.[16] 
Australia 
In contrast to the tightly structured proceedings of the GPhC, Australian tribunals are 
not subject to the strict controls imposed by adoption of the concept of fitness to 
practise. Hearings are subject only to generic rules & regulations dealing with each 
State or Territory’s Civil and Administrative or Health Practitioners Tribunal. The 
South Australian Health Practitioners Tribunal, for example, is not bound by the rules 
of evidence and may inform itself on any matter as it sees fit. It must act according to 
equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case, without regard to 
technicalities and legal forms.[3](s.18(9)) The tribunal rules are much less restrictive 
than those directing the GPhC, and any sitting tribunals “may dispense with 
compliance with any part of these Rules” and “do all or any acts or give any 
directions relating to the conduct of a proceeding as it thinks proper to dispose of 
that proceeding expeditiously”.[17](rule 3(2)) 
New York 
Similarly, an NYOP hearing panel is not bound by the rules of evidence, but its 
determination of guilt must be based on a preponderance of the evidence.[2](s.6510(3)(c)) 
New Brunswick 
At hearings of the New Brunswick Discipline & Fitness to Practise Committee, the 
procedures follow those of the Court of Queen's Bench in civil actions, with such 
modifications as the Committee may decide.[6](s.96(a)) 
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Penalties 
Great Britain 
If a Fitness to Practise panel of the GPhC concludes that the pharmacist’s fitness to 
practise is impaired, the following sanctions are available: 
• to take no action; 
• to accept undertakings offered by the pharmacist; 
• to place conditions on the pharmacist’s registration; 
• to suspend the pharmacist’s registration; or 
• to remove the pharmacist’s name from the Register of Pharmacists. 
Australia 
Where a pharmacist’s actions have been found to constitute professional 
misconduct, unprofessional conduct, or unsatisfactory performance, and Australian 
tribunal may direct any of the following actions: 
• no further action; 
• reprimand; 
• the placing of conditions on registration; 
• suspension of registration; or 
• erasure from the register. 
New York 
The NYOP’s adjudication process is much more time- and labour-intensive than the 
other processes discussed here. A hearing panel cannot impose punishments: 
rather, they produce a written report, which must include: findings of fact; a 
determination of guilty or not guilty on each charge; and – in the event of a 
determination of guilty – a recommendation of the penalty to be imposed. For the 
panel to make a guilty determination, a minimum of two of the voting members of the 
panel must vote for such a determination.[2](s.6510(3)(d)) Before any penalty can be 
imposed, the transcript and report of the hearing panel must be reviewed at a 
meeting by a Regents Review Committee consisting of three members, and 
appointed by the Board of Regents.[2](s.6510(4)(a)) The pharmacist may choose to 
appear at the meeting, or the regents review committee may require them to appear. 
In either case, the pharmacist may be represented by counsel. After the meeting, the 
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regents review committee must itself produce a written report of its review to the 
Board of Regents.[2](s.6510(4)(b)) 
Finally, the Board of Regents must consider the transcript and the report of the 
Hearing Panel, and the report of the Regents Review Committee. It must decide 
whether the licensee is guilty or not guilty on each charge; what penalties, if any, to 
impose; and must issue an order to carry out its decisions. Such decisions require 
the affirmative vote of a majority of the members of the Board of Regents. Only the 
Board of Regents can impose penalties. If the Board of Regents disagrees with the 
hearing panel's determination of not guilty, it must remand the matter to the original 
panel for reconsideration, or to a new panel for a new hearing. The panel's 
determination of not guilty following reconsideration or a new hearing shall be 
final.[2](s.6510(4)(c)) 
The Board of Regents has a large range of “punishments” available to it than either 
the GPhC or MBA. These include fines, public service, and partial 
suspensions.[2](s.6511) The Board may order any of the following: 
• reprimand; 
• completion of education or training; 
• limitation of license to practice; 
• suspension of license (partial or complete); 
• revocation/annulment of license; 
• fine (up to $10,000 for each charge); or 
• 100 hours of public service. 
New Brunswick 
If a panel of the CPNB’s Discipline and Fitness to Practise Committee finds that a 
respondent is guilty of conduct deserving sanction, it may do one or a combination of 
the following: 
• dismiss the complaint; 
• admonish or reprimand the pharmacist; 
• order the pharmacist to undergo counselling; 
• order that the pharmacist pay a fine to the College; 
• place conditions on the pharmacist’s practise; 
• suspend the pharmacist’s license to practise; 
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• accept undertakings from the pharmacist in lieu of suspension; or 
• revoke the licensure of the pharmacist.[6](ss.98 & 100) 
Appeals 
Great Britain 
Any decision that restricts a pharmacist’s registration or removes the pharmacist 
from the Register of Pharmacists can be appealed in the High Court (or in the Court 
of Session in Scotland) under art.58 of the Pharmacy Order 2010.[4] The GPhC, in 
common with all statutory bodies overseen by the PSA, is bound by rulings of the 
Administrative Court of the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court (and its 
equivalent in Scotland), and may have to change its guidance for deciding whether a 
pharmacist’s fitness to practise is impaired based out the outcome of such 
appeals.[18, 19] 
Australia 
The appeal body in an Australian case depends the state or territory in which the 
tribunal sits,[10](s.199) which itself is determined by where the alleged misconduct 
occurred, or – where it occurred in multiple jurisdictions – the practitioner’s “principal 
place of practice”.[10](s.193(2)) Appeals must be made either within 28 or 30 days, 
depending the court procedures rules regulating each state or territory. 
New York 
The decisions of the Board of Regents may be reviewed pursuant to the proceedings 
under the New York State’s Civil Practice Law and Rules.[2](s.6510(5)),[20] Decisions of 
the Board of Regents cannot be stayed or enjoined except upon application to the 
appellate division, and upon a showing that the petitioner has a substantial likelihood 
of success. 
New Brunswick 
A party to the proceedings who is affected by an order of the Discipline and Fitness 
to Practise Committee may appeal to the Court of Appeal of New Brunswick on a 
question of law or fact.[6](s.111) A respondent who makes such an appeal may also 
apply on motion for an order staying the Committee’s order pending the 
appeal.[6](s.113(1)) 
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Discussion 
Investigation 
The initial stages of any investigation are broadly similar, regardless of the 
jurisdiction involved: a complaint is received and parsed for frivolity, vexatiousness, 
or spuriousness; substantive complaints are then subject to further investigation, the 
outcome of which is reported to an “investigating committee.” In cases that meet 
specified threshold criteria, the GPhC, NYOP, or PBA may refer the matter for 
adjudication, effectively bypassing their respective investigating committees. 
Furthermore, the NYOP may bypass the Hearing Panel where the alleged 
misconduct is of a type that applies equally to all regulated professions rather than 
just to pharmacists. 
In contrast, all complaints investigated in New Brunswick must be considered by 
their Complaints Committee before they can be referred. The Complaints Committee 
is essentially a parsing committee, which decides which issues can be dealt with a 
minor sanction, and which must be referred for adjudication. In cases where the 
threshold criteria for direct referral for adjudication are not met (i.e. the vast majority 
of cases), this is also true of the analgous GPhC and PBA committees. 
The NYOP’s Violations Committee, however, has no such sorting function: it is the 
PCO decides if a case is sent to the Violations Committee or referred to a Hearing 
Panel. The former route is only available where the violations are minor and 
uncontested. 
No single jurisdiction has an investigating process that is clearly superior to the 
others. Each have subtle differences that afford some level of advantage or 
disadvantage over their comparators. In New Brunswick, for example, all 
pharmacists are subject to the same stepwise process. While this can be seen to 
promote fairness, it can also be resource-intensive, especially in cases where it is 
obvious from an early stage that the Discipline and Fitness to Practise Committee 
will feature in the process. Conversely, the process in New York may be seen to 
encourage pharmacists accused of minor violations to accept a reprimand or fine 
from the Violations Committee rather than going through a stressful and expensive 
adversarial Hearing Panel, even where they believe there are mitigating 
circumstances that might ultimately lead to a not-guilty verdict.  
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Presumption of innocence 
In Great Britain, New Brunswick and Australia – where interim suspensions can be 
applied on public safety grounds - a pharmacist may see his or her employment 
brought to a sudden halt by reason of an allegation against them which may 
subsequently prove groundless. In New Brunswick alone, this is tempered in some 
small way by the requirement to complete the investigation before imposing interim 
measures. Only in New York is a pharmacist truly innocent until proven guilty. 
Fit to practise? 
Each of the four regulators have a fundamental duty to ensure the safety of patients 
and the public. Although disciplinary proceeding may also have a remit to uphold 
standards and to maintain confidence in the profession, its primary function is one of 
patient safety. The presentation of the case in Australia, New York, and New 
Brunswick is essentially as follows: on the basis of the facts found, did the 
pharmacist commit an act of misconduct? The British process adds the subsequent 
step of assessing whether the registrants fitness to practice is currently impaired as 
a result of that misconduct. Following a series of high-profile appeal cases in the UK 
High Court, it must behove a Fitness to Practise Committee to consider facts 
material to the practitioner’s fitness to practise looking forward.[16, 21, 22] 
Although fitness to practise will, by necessity, have been impaired at the time the 
misconduct occurred, the pharmacist’s behaviour in the interim period, during which 
they are free to continue unimpeded in their practice (unless interim measures are in 
place), must be considered if a panel can claim to be looking forward when deciding 
the current status of fitness to practice. This is particularly relevant in cases where 
the pharmacist has made an effort to remedy any shortcomings that contributed to 
the misconduct. 
The inclusion of this step focuses panellists on their patient safety remit, away from 
the punitive mindset that could be fostered when terms such as “guilty” and 
“punishment” are used in the legislation and guidance, as they are in the North 
American jurisdictions. Indeed, the GPhC’s guidance for fitness to practise 
committees specifically states that: 
“Fitness to practise sanctions are used to protect patients and the wider public 
interest. Whilst the effect some sanctions have, for example a suspension or 
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removal, could be punitive, a sanction must not be imposed to punish a 
registrant.”[23](para. 4.1) 
Adjudicators: profession or public 
In all but the most exceptional circumstances, a GPhC Fitness to Practise panel 
maintains a two thirds majority of lay members over pharmacist members. In New 
York, there is usually a majority of pharmacists. New Brunswick’s panels of at least 
five members must contain only one lay member. Although the wording of the 
Pharmacy Act does not preclude a panel of three or four lay members, the fact that 
the pool from which they are drawn consists of “at least ten” pharmacists and “at 
least two” lay members strongly indicates that the intention is for there always to be 
a significant majority of pharmacists over lay members on any given panel.[6](s.91(1)) 
Regardless of the state or territory in which an Australian tribunal is heard, there is 
never a majority of lay members on a panel. 
In Great Britain, lay members cannot be recruited from practising or retired 
healthcare professionals. Neither New Brunswick nor Australia specify what the 
background of its lay membership must be. New York’s requirement that at least one 
lay member must be a member of another regulated profession, when combined with 
the necessity for a majority of pharmacist members, has the effect on ensuring that, 
in the vast majority of cases, there is only one lay member – with a background in a 
closely-related profession to the accused pharmacist – on the panel. 
Given that the remit of the Committee is to protect the public, and not to represent 
the interests of pharmacists, ensuring that disciplinary cases are presided over by a 
majority of lay people would appear to be the logical approach. It might be counter-
argued that for self-regulated professions it is important that panellists have a first-
hand knowledge of the profession that they are required to rule upon: however, the 
GPhC makes provision for specialist advisers – which may be pharmacists – to be 
present as fitness to practise hearings if their advice is deemed necessary.[9](rule 23) 
No such provision is provided for in the legislation for New York or New Brunswick, 
nor in Australia, where tribunals are constrained by each state or territory’s Tribunal 
Act. 
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Judge, jury, and executioner (… and standard-setter … and prosecutor) 
In UK law, most healthcare regulators are responsible for both the investigation and 
adjudication of allegations of concerns raised about their registrants. This has led to 
criticism that as the standard-setters, prosecutors and adjudicators, the regulators’ 
adjudicatory independence is open to question. The medical profession were first to 
address this issue in the aftermath of the inquiry into the actions of the family doctor 
and prolific serial killer, Harold Shipman. In 2004, the Fifth Report of the Shipman 
Inquiry recommended the clear separation of adjudication from the other functions of 
the General Medical Council (GMC) through the establishment of an independent 
judicial body, which eventually took the form of the Medical Practitioners Tribunal 
Service (MPTS).[24](paras. 27.204-210) 
The MPTS was set up in 2012 to provide better separation between the GMC’s 
investigation and adjudication functions; and to take over responsibility for the day-
to-day management of hearings, panellists and their decisions. The MPTS is funded 
by the GMC, but is accountable directly to Parliament, to which it reports on an 
annual basis. The GMC is responsible for investigating concerns about those who 
wish to be registered as doctors.[25](s.1B(c)) If an investigation undertaken by the GMC 
calls a registrant's fitness to practise into question, the MPTS adjudicates 
proceedings and to issue a sanction, where appropriate.  
The MPTS has attracted much critical scrutiny since its formation, both as a discrete 
organisation, and has the part of the regulatory framework for healthcare professions 
in the UK.[26-30] The further separation of investigation and adjudication by 
transferring the adjudicative function from the MPTS to the First-tier Tribunal (Health, 
Education and Social Care Chamber) was considered by the Law Commission’s 
2014 review of healthcare regulation: however, it ultimately decided that the MPTS – 
though not fully separate from the GMC – did have a high degree of independence, 
and recommended that other healthcare regulators move towards such a system.[31] 
To date, no regulator – including the GPhC – has done so. 
The NBCP, in common with all Canadian territories, does not devolve its 
adjudicatory function to an independent (or semi-independent) body. 
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In contrast, the formation of the AHPRA in Australia saw the complete devolvement 
of all adjudicatory functions to independent Civil and Administrative or Healthcare 
Tribunals, thus avoiding any possible accusations of partiality. 
The presence of a Board of Regents which makes decisions based on 
recommendations of the NYOP leads to a separation of investigation and 
adjudication that lies somewhere in-between those of Great Britain and Canada, and 
Australia, respectively. Although the Hearing Panel and Regents Review Panel are 
part of the NYOP, neither may direct that a pharmacist is subjected to any 
punishment: rather, their respective recommendations are taken into account by the 
Board of Regents – which oversees the NYOP – when deciding whether to punish 
the registrant. This may be thought of as an in-built appeals process, especially 
given that the pharmacist may choose to appear before the Regents Review Panel 
when it meets to consider the Hearing Panel’s recommendations. 
Conclusions 
This work constitutes the first comparison of the technical aspects of four 
procedurally-different system seeking to attain the same goals, namely: to enforce 
standards set by their respective regulatory frameworks with a view to protecting 
patients and the wider public interest. 
While no one system may be considered perfect, each contains processes that could 
potentially benefit the others. For each step in the process, one or other jurisdiction 
takes a position to act in the interests of either the public or of the pharmacist, or to 
occupy some middle ground. The ease with which a pharmacist’s license to practise 
can be suspended is, perhaps, too easy in Great Britain: in the six-month period 
between reviews, one could easily imagine a pharmacist losing their job, defaulting 
on their mortgage, and having their life spiral downwards on the basis of an 
accusation that later proves to be utterly groundless. Conversely, in New York, 
where there is no option of interim suspension, there is a very real risk that a 
dangerous pharmacist could be allowed to continue to work with patients while the 
case against them is built. New Brunswick’s requirement that a full investigation is 
carried out in advance of any interim measures seems like a pragmatic compromise. 
Of the four jurisdictions examined, Great Britain most clearly acts in the interest of 
the public and the profession – rather than the respondent pharmacist – at every 
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step of its process. The framing of misconduct in terms of impairment of fitness to 
practise ensures that protection of the public and maintenance of public confidence 
in the profession are to the fore of panel members’ minds when deciding how to 
dispose of a case. Additionally, the GPhC is the only regulator for which lay panel 
members outnumber pharmacist members in almost all cases. Furthermore, these 
lay members are defined in such a way that they cannot be members of other 
healthcare professions that might have a professional bias in matters of misconduct.  
While sanctions handed down by the GPhC may seem punitive to the pharmacist 
receiving them, their function is clearly not to punish. Indeed, disbarred pharmacists 
should be happy to be that, if it improves the levels of safety in the profession of 
pharmacy, as this benefits both them – and those close to them – who use its 
services. Conversely, the penalties issued in New York and New Brunswick include 
a fine, which can have little function other than a punitive one: it does not protect the 
public, nor does it do much to uphold public confidence in the profession. 
Only Australia has an independent adjudicator: in all other instances, the regulator 
sets standards, investigates complaints, brings charges, and adjudicates upon them, 
leaving them open to accusations of acting from self-interest. In the UK, the medical 
regulator occupies a middle ground by using a semi-independent adjudicator, but it is 
noteworthy that the pharmacy regulator has not availed of this model despite 
government recommendations in that direction. 
Future work 
Having examined the processes involved in dealing with misconduct in these four 
jurisdictions, the next step will be to compare outcomes. To this end, we are 
currently seeking funding to examine how each regulator interprets similar behaviour 
when assessing a pharmacist’s misconduct and deciding on the appropriate sanction 
to apply. This will involve subjecting hearing transcripts from each jurisdiction to 
directed content analysis. Answering the question of whether similar behaviour leads 
to similar outcomes across these jurisdictions will allow us to better understand 
whether the procedural differences highlighted have any meaningful difference on 
the work of the respective regulators. 
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